Teacher career reforms in Peru

Margarita Mendoza Choque
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About the project

Teacher career reforms are high on the agenda of many governments. A number of countries have reformed their teacher career structures over the past decades. Others have foreseen introducing changes in the near future. Yet, as countries launch into such reforms, it is important to make information available on the diversity of options and their implications.

The potential to learn from other countries, combined with the need to address this gap, prompted the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) to launch a research programme on teacher career organization and management. It aims to provide policy-makers and governments with a variety of policy choices related to teacher careers, and to explore perceived effects on teacher motivation, attraction, and retention as well as implementation challenges that countries face in the reform process. This information is essential for countries wishing to adapt their teacher careers before they decide to opt into complex and resource-intensive reforms.

The following research questions guide the project:

- What options exist in terms of the organization and management of teacher careers? How are teacher careers structured and promotion modalities organized?
- What are the perceived effects of different career models on teacher motivation, attraction, and retention?
- What difficulties are countries experiencing with regard to the management of their teacher career scheme? What are the implications and implementation challenges of different teacher career models?

The project started in 2015 with ‘Exploring the impact of career models on teacher motivation’ (Crehan, 2016), an exploratory study that reviewed the available research literature in the field of teacher career organization and the psychology of motivation. It framed the typology of career models and evaluation modalities referred to in this research. Field research followed: participating countries were purposely selected from among different geographical zones and income levels and because their reforms sought to diversify teacher career structures and professional advancement opportunities available to teachers.

In 2016, country reports collected accurate descriptions of teacher career structures in Colombia, Ethiopia, Lithuania, Mexico, Peru, Scotland, South Africa, and Thailand as well as information related to the reform process. Researchers analysed laws and regulations, basic statistics, and existing research evidence in addition to conducting semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the organization and management of teacher careers.

In 2017, in-depth case studies in Ecuador, New York City, and the Western Cape in South Africa were conducted. Their purpose was to provide a more thorough analysis and to find out from teachers themselves their perspective on changes made to their career. The career models implemented in Ecuador, New York City, and the Western Cape were selected because of their promising approach combining career opportunities with new evaluation and salary policies. This research relied on qualitative interviews with teachers and leadership staff as well as quantitative data from teacher questionnaires to capture the diversity and complexity of teacher careers in these different countries.

The research looked into a variety of career structure design elements that can give insights into career reforms on managerial and administrative levels. The research findings highlight key aspects that policy-makers need to consider before embarking on teacher career reforms.
Other Country Notes in this series:

- Teacher career reforms in Colombia
- Teacher career reforms in Ethiopia
- Teacher career reforms in Lithuania
- Teacher career reforms in Mexico: The initial stage (2013–2015)
- Teacher career reforms in Scotland
- Teacher career reforms in South Africa
- Teacher career reforms in Thailand

Case Studies in this series:

- Reforma de la carrera docente en Ecuador
- Teacher Career Pathways in New York City
- Teacher Career Pathways in South Africa: Insights from the Western Cape
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Contratación Administrativa de Servicios (Administrative Service Contract)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPPe</td>
<td>Colegio de Profesores del Perú (Peru Teachers College)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRE</td>
<td>Dirección Regional de Educación (Regional Education Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCPM</td>
<td>Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial (Public Teaching Career Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Ley del Profesorado (Teachers’ Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRM</td>
<td>Ley de Reforma Magisterial (Teacher Reform Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBDD</td>
<td>Marco del Buen Desempeño Docente (Teacher Performance Framework)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINEDU</td>
<td>Ministerio de Educación (Ministry of Education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIM</td>
<td>remuneración integra mensual (integrated monthly salary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUTEP</td>
<td>Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú (Peru Education Workers Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGEL</td>
<td>Unidad de Gestión Local (Education Management Unit)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Introduction

A teacher career reform was adopted in 2012 in Peru as part of a national effort to enhance the value of the teaching profession and restore confidence in the government’s ability to efficiently administer the career structure. The Ley de Reforma Magisterial (LRM, Teacher Reform Law) was aimed at harmonizing existing regulations whereby teachers belonged to different pay systems and career frameworks. It introduced a new career structure providing all public service teachers with the same requirements, rights, and opportunities. The LRM linked teachers’ promotions and salary increases to their professional performance. The reform’s design strongly emphasized setting up clear horizontal and vertical career paths and evaluation procedures.

The first years of LRM implementation saw several challenges being overcome, including marking a positive shift in the discourse about the teaching profession. They have also highlighted the political and technical complexity of implementing a new career structure that relies on large-scale evaluations.

The information in this study comes from analysis of current laws, regulations, and statistics from the Ministerio de Educación (MINEDU, Ministry of Education), as well as national and international research on the subject. The information was enriched through six semi-structured interviews conducted with representatives or ex-representatives of bodies related to teacher career organization and management: MINEDU, the Sindicato Unitario de Trabajadores de la Educación del Perú (SUTEP, Peru Education Workers Union), the Colegio de Profesores del Perú (CPPe, Peru Teachers College), and the Consejo Nacional de Educación (National Education Council). In addition, some teachers were consulted, along with a regional director of education from the Apurímac region.

The teacher career structure in Peru consists of:

- a career ladder, which provides two pathways for teacher promotion: pedagogical management and institutional management;
- salary progression based on appraisal, allowing teachers to increase their professional status and move to higher salary levels;
- a bonus pay model, through which teachers can receive bonuses related to their performance and professional path.

Evaluation is at the heart of the teacher career structure. The Marco del Buen Desempeño Docente (MBDD, Teacher Performance Framework) is a reference document used in all evaluations. It seeks to apply transparent and legitimate assessment processes so as to curb evaluation malpractice and abuse of power by evaluation committees (MINEDU, 2012).

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1. The fieldwork and preliminary research took place over the course of 2015.
2. Contextual information

2.1 Teaching staff profiles

Teachers in Peru are either permanent (nombrados) or contract (contratados). Vacancies not filled by permanent teachers are filled by contract teachers through a public competition (concurso público de contratación docente). In addition, in certain cases, especially in rural areas, community teachers with lower qualifications (e.g. secondary education) are hired for unfilled vacancies, but they are not discussed in this study.

In 2015, public schools employed 139,645 teachers in primary and 132,085 in secondary education (MINEDU, n.d.). MINEDU’s Dirección General de Desarrollo Docente (Teacher Development Department) calculated that, out of 400,428 teachers in all, 126,393 or nearly one-third (31 per cent) were contract teachers due to government measures allowing for mass entry of poorly trained teachers to minimize the cost of expanding access to education (Van der Tuin and Verger, 2013). Teacher numbers have been increasing since 2008, mostly through expansion of pre-primary and secondary education in urban areas (see Table 1).

Table 1. Teacher numbers in basic regular education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-primary</td>
<td>29,670</td>
<td>38,587</td>
<td>51,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>140,552</td>
<td>137,806</td>
<td>139,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>117,283</td>
<td>122,318</td>
<td>132,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>287,505</td>
<td>298,711</td>
<td>323,597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINEDU (n.d.).

The number of teachers entering the profession has remained high despite a relative decrease in salaries since 1950 (Saavedra, 2000). In 2015, for example, 205,021 candidates applied for 19,631 vacancies in basic regular education (pre-primary, primary, and secondary); that is, more than 10 per position. At the secondary level, where the competition was greatest, there were 21 candidates for each position (MINEDU, n.d.). In a context of high unemployment, the job stability offered by teaching partly explains the large candidate pool. However, low salary levels and difficult working conditions limit the attractiveness of the teaching profession in Peru (Van der Tuin and Verger, 2013).

2.2 Key legislation and main actors

Legislation

The LRM is the main national law governing teacher careers. It applies to all permanent and contract teachers in public schools, although contract teachers do not benefit from the same career opportunities as permanent teachers.

The LRM is framed within the Constitution, the 2003 Ley General de Educación (General Education Law), and annual budget laws. It seeks to ensure quality in educational institutions, increase the aptitude of teachers and educational authorities, assess merit in job performance, create equitable conditions for salary increases, promote better living and working conditions for teachers, determine criteria and evaluation processes, and establish the basis for a high-quality system of continuous professional development (MINEDU, 2012).
Before the LRM, teachers fell into two groups, each regulated by different legislation: the 1984 Ley del Profesorado (LP, Teachers’ Law) and the 2007 Ley de la Carrera Pública Magisterial (LCPM, Public Teaching Career Law). Now the LRM applies to both groups as well as new entrants and contract teachers (see Table 2).

Table 2. Distribution of teachers by regulatory framework, 2008–2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New entrants*</td>
<td>Former LP teachers integrated into the LCPM**</td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>271,525</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>2,501</td>
<td>36,684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>242,036</td>
<td>22,506</td>
<td>9,343</td>
<td>31,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>235,225</td>
<td>22,506</td>
<td>16,016</td>
<td>38,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>218,124</td>
<td>30,524</td>
<td>24,966</td>
<td>55,490</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Chiroque Chunga (2013); * Calculation made by the author; ** MINEDU (2012)

Pre-LRM, the majority of teachers fell under the LP. LP teachers are among the most experienced, and many are affiliated with teacher unions, yet their salaries were frozen for a long time (Rivero, 2003; Saavedra, 2000; Díaz and Saavedra, 2002; Paiba, 2007; Tovar, Gorriti, and Morillo, 1989; Chiroque Chunga, 2006). Teachers previously regulated by the LCPM are those who joined the profession between 2008 and 2011. They were the first generation of teachers required to undergo evaluation to gain entry to and remain in the profession, as well as for salary increases. The national teachers’ union, SUTEP, resisted the possibility of dismissal tied to low performance evaluation of in-service teachers (Van der Tuin and Verger, 2013). LCPM teachers did the same tasks as LP teachers but received higher salaries. Table 2 depicts the numbers of teachers under each regulatory framework between 2008 and 2011.

Table 3 summarizes the status quo under the LP and the main changes introduced with the LCPM and LRM.

The two teacher groups – those entering the profession before and after 2008 – had conflicting identities due to their differences in regulations, promotion modalities, and salaries. This situation negatively affected the voluntary integration of LP teachers into the LCPM. There was a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to effectively administer in-service teacher evaluations, as well as related uncertainty over job stability and promotion rules. Thus, ‘teachers feel safer operating under the old law, even when it potentially means having a lower salary’ (Van der Tuin and Verger, 2013: 135).

Actors involved

MINEDU is the key institution responsible for the design of the teacher career structure. The design of a new education law is prepared after a series of discussions and agreements among the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Central Reserve Bank, the Ministry of Justice, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, and Congress, especially the Education Commission. The new law becomes public when presented to Congress for discussion and voting.

2. It is worth mentioning that as the LP was adopted at the end of a government mandate, its implementation and budget allocation were left to the following government and were not done effectively. In particular, in the 1990s, additional rules were enacted that led to a lack of coherence and integration, reducing the effectiveness of teacher career regulation (Rivero, 2003). High turnover of education ministers between 1980 and 2006, moreover, resulted in a lack of leadership and commitment to support efforts to implement the teacher career policy (Corrales, 1999).
Table 3. Key characteristics introduced by LP, LCPM, and LRM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Automatic and universal integration of teachers</td>
<td>Gradual and voluntary integration of teachers</td>
<td>Automatic and universal integration of teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority aspect dominates</td>
<td>Meritocracy aspect dominates</td>
<td>Meritocracy aspect dominates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two streams available to teachers: (1) teaching and (2) management</td>
<td>Three streams available to teachers: (1) pedagogical management, (2) institutional management, and (3) investigation</td>
<td>Four streams available to teachers: (1) pedagogical management, (2) institutional management, (3) teacher education, and (4) innovation and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five levels in the salary spine</td>
<td>Five levels in the salary spine (reaching the highest level in 20 years)</td>
<td>Eight levels in the salary spine (reaching the highest level in 30 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not establish exact percentage increase among five salary spine levels</td>
<td>Establishes exact, permanent percentage increase among five salary spine levels</td>
<td>Establishes exact, permanent percentage increase among eight salary spine levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not establish periodic mandatory evaluations to move forward in the career</td>
<td>Establishes periodic mandatory evaluations to move forward in the career</td>
<td>Establishes periodic mandatory evaluations to move forward in the career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure in the evaluation does not lead to teacher dismissal</td>
<td>Failure in the evaluation (three times) leads to teacher dismissal</td>
<td>Failure in the evaluation (three times) leads to teacher dismissal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from MINEDU (2012).

The Ministry of Economy and Finance authorizes budget allocations for activities provided for in the law (in this case, salary spine, bonuses, incentives, awards, evaluations, salary increases, contracts, etc.). It and MINEDU participate in decisions related to numbers of vacancies open to new entrants, of promoted posts, and of teachers who can receive a salary increase. MINEDU defines the procedures, instruments, and systems of point calculation for the evaluations that teachers have to undergo throughout their career.

The Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (National Statistics and Informatics Institute) is in charge of building indicators related to conditions of employment (e.g. in rural areas) and evaluations for admission to the profession, salary increase, and promotion.

MINEDU and its decentralized offices (Direcciones Regionales de Educación, DREs, Educational Regional Boards) and Unidades de Gestión Local (UGELs, Education Management Units) are key actors in implementation of regulations. At the local and school levels, evaluation committees are established; the members may include teacher and parent representatives, depending on the purpose of the evaluation (salary increase or promotion).

These committees consolidate evaluation results and make final decisions regarding which teachers receive a salary increase or promotion. The law specifies the functions and profiles of teachers who are eligible to sit on the committees.

The LRM changed the way SUTEP and the CPPe participated in teacher career design and implementation. Neither was involved in designing the law, although they contributed to the elaboration of regulations after the reform was approved. They no longer take part in evaluation committees, and thus see their role diminishing, especially when it comes to budgetary decisions and supervision of implementation (see Table 4).
Table 4. Main actors and their responsibilities under the LRM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry of Education</th>
<th>Ministry of Economy and Finance</th>
<th>DREs and UGELs</th>
<th>CPPe and SUTEP</th>
<th>Evaluation committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Plays a key role in the design of the law</td>
<td>• Authorizes budget allocations</td>
<td>• Serve as key actors in implementation of the reform</td>
<td>• Do not participate in evaluation committees</td>
<td>• Consolidate evaluation results and take final decisions about which teachers receive promotion/salary increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• With the Ministry of Economy and Finance, determines the number of vacancies for entry, promotion, and salary increase</td>
<td>• With the Ministry of Education, determines the number of vacancies for entry, promotion, and salary increase</td>
<td>• Verify committee configuration</td>
<td>• Are involved in negotiations and debates regarding regulations following the law being approved</td>
<td>• Verify candidates' compliance with requirements and conduct the evaluation process at the local level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prepares evaluation tools, standardizes evaluation procedures, and, in some cases, consolidates results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Created by author.

2.3 New entrants to the profession

Requirements for entry to the profession

To enter the teaching profession, a candidate must:

- have a teaching degree from an instituto superior pedagógico (higher pedagogical institute) or a university degree in education,³
- be in good physical and mental condition,
- have no criminal or police record,
- be Peruvian by birth, and
- be duly accredited by the CPPe, with certain exceptions.⁴

Anyone meeting these requirements is eligible to undergo the evaluation for entrance to the teaching profession. This evaluation is organized every two years and consists of two phases:

- The first phase is organized by MINEDU. A successful score is mandatory to go to the second phase. Aspects evaluated include general skills, discipline-related or specialized knowledge, common pedagogical knowledge according to teaching level (pre-primary, primary, secondary), subject, and modality (e.g. regular education, productive technical education).

³ Both equivalent to a bachelor's degree.
⁴ To be a teacher in Peru, all candidates formerly had to be educated at a colegiado (teachers’ college). Since 2010, teachers working in Peru who hold other degrees or who obtained teaching qualifications abroad have been exempt from this requirement. The CPPe advises the government and participates in decision-making in the field of education, aiming to ensure teaching quality and defend members' interests.
The second phase is usually organized at the school level and evaluates teaching skills, professional preparation, merits, and experience. Procedures, instruments, and the system of point calculation are defined by MINEDU. At the school level, an evaluation committee, led by the principal, is formed. Members include a vice-principal or an academic coordinator, and a parent representative (with a higher education degree or teacher education) from the Consejo Educativo Institucional (Institutional Board of Education).

In both phases, the evaluation is cumulative, as different weights are given to various criteria. During the first phase, a partial but eliminating score is obtained. In the second phase, other elements, such as portfolio assessment and class observation, are included. The scores of the two phases are added up. Candidates with the best scores enter the teaching profession and become permanent teachers (nombrados). The number of vacancies is set in advance. All beginner teachers have to start their career by teaching in the classroom for at least three years.

**Induction period**

For the first six months of their career, beginner permanent teachers (those with less than two years of experience in public education) go through an induction period conducted by a teacher mentor. The mentor is assigned through regional competitive process among teachers who have reached at least Level III on the escala magisterial (teacher salary spine). A teacher mentor can come from the same school or same UGEL as the mentee. At the end of the induction period, teachers are expected to undergo an evaluation whose results are to be incorporated in their first regular teacher performance evaluation. In 2015, 1,404 teachers went through induction. At the time of research, no post-induction evaluations had yet been administered.

**2.4 Salary**

**Starting salary**

All teachers start at Level I of the escala magisterial and receive the remuneración integra mensual (RIM, integrated monthly salary), determined nationally. However, MINEDU created an incentive programme for beginner teachers, the Bono de Atracción (Attraction Bonus), which awards a total of PEN 18,000 (about US$5,603) to teachers who were among the top three in their entry evaluation and have a 30-hour workweek. The incentive is paid monthly (PEN 500/US$155) for the first three years, when a teacher cannot move above Level I on the escala magisterial.

**Salary composition and increases**

A beginning teacher’s monthly pay consists of RIM plus bonuses, benefits, and other incentives. RIM varies according to work hours. Table 5 shows the amount of RIM at Level I for various workweek durations.

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5. Candidates can only apply for one vacancy. If they do not succeed, they do not enter the profession. However, after the results are presented to the candidates, there is the possibility of declaring vacant places (usually in rural and dispersed areas). Candidates who did not get their chosen job can apply for those positions that remain vacant, although the entry process is longer and more cumbersome.

6. The exchange rate used in this document is US$1 = 3.21 soles (ISO 4217 PEN).

7. The majority of teachers work 30 hours per week, and efforts are being made to bring all teachers’ workweeks to this level.

8. The LRM defines working hours while the teacher is in charge of a classroom, also known as pedagogical hours (45 minutes), as time spent with students.
Table 5. The amount of RIM at Level I of the pay scale according to work hours

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level I</th>
<th>Duration of the workweek</th>
<th>24 hours</th>
<th>26 hours</th>
<th>30 hours</th>
<th>40 hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PEN 1,243.92 (US$378)</td>
<td>PEN 1,347.58 (US$419)</td>
<td>PEN 1,554.90 (US$484)</td>
<td>PEN 2,073.30 (US$645)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINEDU (2012).

The LRM sets out an *escala magisterial* with eight levels, and with no additional responsibilities associated with each level. *Table 6* shows the salary associated with each level, expressed as a percentage of RIM.

Table 6. Levels of the *escala magisterial*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Salary (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINEDU (2012).

**Excellence recognition bonuses**

Since 1949 there has been a mechanism for annual recognition of certain teachers. A limited number of outstanding classroom teachers and other education professionals are given Palmas Magisteriales (Teaching Awards) in three categories: Grado de Amauta (from the Quechua for ‘sage’; up to 5 teachers receive a one-off payment of PEN 15,000/US$4,669); Grado de Maestro (up to 15 teachers receive PEN 1,500/US$467 per month for life); and Grado de Educador (up to 20 teachers receive PEN 1,000/US$311 per month for life). The third award is for classroom teachers only while the first two are open to all education professionals.

The Grado de Educador is a symbolic and economic recognition granted to teachers for outstanding pedagogical work, education quality, dedication to students, and exemplary conduct. Teachers are selected through portfolio evaluation and are honoured at an official ceremony. This recognition is not associated with additional responsibilities.
3. Detailed description of teacher career models and evaluation strategies

The teacher career structure in Peru consists of the following models: salary progression based on appraisal, the career ladder, and the bonus pay model.

3.1 Escala magisterial: Salary progression based on appraisal

Several factors are considered when determining whether a teacher is to receive an increase on the teacher salary spine, the escala magisterial:

- years in teaching service and at the current level (see Table 7);
- previous teacher performance evaluation (evaluación de desempeño);
- specific evaluation determining whether a teacher can receive a salary increase (evaluación de ascenso);
- advanced academic degree (master’s to reach Level VII; PhD to reach Level VIII).

Table 7 indicates the number of years of stay at each level and total teaching experience that a teacher needs for each step on the escala magisterial.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Duration of stay at each level</th>
<th>Experience needed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>7 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>11 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>25 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Until retirement</td>
<td>35 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MINEDU (2012).

The evaluation for a salary increase looks at ethical and professional criteria, including job-related competences, ability to update one’s knowledge, and achievements attained. The key characteristics of this evaluation are:

- **Cumulative evaluation**: MINEDU determines what weight is given to each criterion listed above.
- **Norm-referenced evaluation**: MINEDU and the Ministry of Economy and Finance determine how many teachers can receive a salary increase per region and per level. The best-evaluated teachers receive pay increases until all the places are filled.
- **Evaluators**: To conduct the evaluation, a salary increase evaluation committee is formed, comprising the director of the UGEL or of the pedagogical management section, who leads the committee; an administrative staff specialist; two education specialists; and representative of the Consejo Participativo Local de Educación (Local Particpative Education Council). Alternatively, the evaluation can be conducted by a third party, which first needs to win a tender, e.g. a company or university that conducts evaluations (i.e. administers the tests to teachers). In such cases the committee consolidates evaluation results and processes, organizes, and publishes the information.
• **Tools**: The committee uses a test and a professional background check to evaluate the teacher’s professional qualifications and achievements. They look at postgraduate studies completed, attainment of a second specialization, ability to update knowledge and participate in training, and recognition of tasks conducted, awards obtained, and research published. Also evaluated are the teacher’s subject mastery and knowledge of pedagogical theory.

### 3.2 Career ladder (promotion)

Initially, all beginner teachers have to start their career by teaching in the classroom. After three years of service, they can choose one of four streams (see Figure 1): pedagogical management, institutional management, teacher education, or innovation and research. (At the time of the research, only the first two were operational.)

#### Figure 1. Streams available to teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pedagogical management</th>
<th>Institutional management</th>
<th>Teacher education</th>
<th>Innovation and research</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Classroom teacher</td>
<td>School principal or vice-principal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student adviser and coordinator</td>
<td>Education specialist in UGEL or DRE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic coordinator</td>
<td>Director of pedagogical management in UGEL or DRE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extracurricular programme coordinator</td>
<td>Director of UGEL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not yet implemented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the LRM.

Access to the various positions is by competition (*evaluación de acceso a cargos*) and lasts for three years. In addition, teachers must have taken (a) 200 hours of special training over the previous five years, (b) postgraduate courses directly related to the responsibilities of the position sought, or (c) a second specialization; passed the *evaluación de desempeño* (performance evaluation); and proved that they have no criminal or police record.

At the end of the three-year term, teachers undergo performance evaluation at the regional level to determine whether they remain in their position. Such an evaluation is conducted annually for the directors of the UGELs and their pedagogical management sections as well as the pedagogical management directors in the DREs.

**Promotion to pedagogical management stream positions**

Horizontal mobility can be associated with the pedagogical management stream, in which teachers carry out classroom teaching and complementary curricular activities in schools, such as leadership, counselling, peer training, student counselling, and academic coordination. Alternatively, it can apply to non-formal programmes, such as the Programa No Escolarizado de Educación Inicial (Non-Formal Initial Education Programme). Teachers in this stream plan, conduct, accompany, and evaluate pedagogical processes that ensure the achievement of student learning in schools.

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9. Internal mentoring mechanisms have been promoted, and at the time of research were expected to continue at least until 2017. Teachers working in the classroom also carry out peer mentoring outside their classroom hours. They receive payment for it on top of the RIM.
For access to positions in the pedagogical management stream, teachers need to be at least at the second level of the escala magisterial. A competition is conducted at the school level in accordance with criteria determined by MINEDU and the regional governments.

Outside the pedagogical management stream, some permanent teachers perform pedagogical support functions related to other teachers’ training. Various programmes employ this strategy (e.g. Programa de Educación ‘Logros de Aprendizaje’ or Learning Achievements Programme). For these positions, teachers must seek a work licence for a Contratación Administrativa de Servicios (CAS, Administrative Service Contract). The time teachers spend doing such work does not count towards promotion on the escala magisterial. To cover such positions, a unified Formación Docente (Teacher Training) category was established. A MINEDU representative explained that it had been difficult to set up the category because so many positions were involved (under different names, departments, functions, etc.) but that it had been a necessity, since creating each position separately would have required unique evaluation strategies and thus been too complicated and costly.

It should be noted that teacher mentors in charge of the induction period are not part of the pedagogical management stream. Nor, at the time of the research, were teacher mentors included in the Formación Docente category. Education officials could consider including Formación Docente in the formal teacher career structure so as to create a pool of candidates with the right profile and commensurate remuneration.

**Promotion to new managerial positions**

The institutional management stream consists of the following positions:

- director of pedagogical management for DRE or UGEL;
- director of UGEL;
- education specialists for DRE or UGEL;
- school principal and vice-principal.

Depending on the position, candidates need to be between Levels III and VIII on the escala magisterial (the higher the position, the higher the required level). When candidates are promoted to a new post, they do not rise to a higher level but instead receive an additional allowance in their monthly pay package.

MINEDU, together with local governments, organizes a national competition every two years that allows entry to new positions. Teachers who become principals or education specialists have a three-year term. Those who become director of UGEL, or director of Pedagogical Management for UGEL or DRE, have a one-year term, after which they must undergo a performance evaluation that determines whether they retain their position. MINEDU and local governments are responsible for updating criteria and indicators for this evaluation, which has the following characteristics:

- **Cumulative evaluation**: Analysis of the professional and personal competences required by the position. Different point scores are attributed to each component, which in the end are summed up into a final grade.
- **Norm-referenced evaluation**: Only the most qualified candidates get the positions.
- **Tools**: Dependent on the position. There is a two-phase evaluation process for the positions of UGEL director and pedagogical management director for UGEL/DRE. The first phase consists of a national evaluation that entails taking a reading comprehension test and solving management and pedagogical case studies. Approved candidates then move on to a regional second phase where they undergo an interview, a competence evaluation, and a check of their professional history.

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10. CAS is a form of public administration contract linking a public entity with a person providing services; the person works independently and there is no employment relationship between them and the entity.
(trayectoria profesional), looking at their merits, professional qualifications, and work experience. The evaluation process for a school principal is also in two phases. The first is national and ranks candidates based on three examinations: reading comprehension, management, and pedagogical knowledge. The second phase is regional and consists of a professional history check.

- **Evaluators:** A promotion committee (comité para el acceso al cargo) is tailored for each position and evaluates teachers who apply.

Teachers in the pedagogical management stream can occupy positions in the institutional management stream temporarily and receive a corresponding salary increase.

It should be noted that the end-of-term evaluations for given promotion posts differ from the planned teacher performance evaluation that will decide whether teachers stay in the profession. The primary aims of the latter evaluation, which is described below, are to verify competence and performance levels established by the Teacher Performance Framework, the MBDD, to identify areas for in-service training, and to identify outstanding teachers.

**Planned teacher performance evaluation**

Not yet operational at the time of the research, this evaluation was expected to take place every three years and be mandatory for all teachers. It would be the largest teacher evaluation ever done in Peru.

This evaluation alone would not lead to a salary increase or promotion, but simply determine whether a teacher remains in post. Teachers who failed the evaluation would have to take six months of remedial training to strengthen their pedagogical capacity. This training is to be designed and implemented by MINEDU or accredited institutions. A teacher who failed the evaluation after retraining would take a second round of remedial training. One aim of the remedial training would be to make the evaluation seem less punitive by providing professional development. A teacher who did not succeed on the third evaluation would be dismissed from their job. Teachers have objected to this possibility of dismissal because it creates job insecurity.

At the time of the research, MINEDU was expected to determine the criteria for the evaluation, as well as indicators for the four areas in the MBDD, varying by modality and education level. The evaluation was expected to be cumulative, and plans called for it to be conducted by a third party that would first undergo a thorough vetting. Results of the evaluation would be consolidated and communicated by the Evaluation Committee at the school level. The committee would be composed of either the school principal, the vice-principal, or an academic coordinator working alongside a teacher meeting certain requirements.

### 3.3 Bonus pay

In 2014, a bonus pay system based on student performance was introduced for managers and for both contract and permanent teachers, with a budget of PEN 75 million (US$23,346) under Decreto de Urgencia N°002-2014. The LRM provided for MINEDU to establish a plan

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11. The evaluation committee for an education specialist position with DRE or UGEL is composed of the head of the relevant MINEDU unit; the director of the DRE or UGEL, who chairs the committee; the personnel chief; and a representative of MINEDU’s Dirección General de Desarrollo Docente (Teacher Development Department). For a position as principal, the committee is composed of the UGEL director (as chair), two school principals who are at the highest level of the salary spine in their jurisdiction, a planning specialist, and a UGEL pedagogical management specialist. The evaluation committee for a hierarchical position at a school is composed of the principal, an academic coordinator, and a teacher who has a similar specialty as the candidate and is at the same or higher salary level.

12. To dismiss a teacher, MINEDU must coordinate with the Ministry of Labour and Promotion of Employment to help the person find a new profession.
of incentives based mostly on student results and implemented with local governments, which can also contribute from their budgets.

A bonus can be obtained when a teacher reaches a new level of qualification (e.g. master’s degree or PhD). At the end of their career, teachers can also receive a one-off payment, depending on the number of years of service.

### 3.4 Other rewards and incentives

Other incentives are also available to teachers even if they cannot be considered bonus pay as such. In 2013, 500 scholarships were offered to teachers who wanted to pursue a bachelor’s degree and 1,000 to those who wanted to pursue a master’s degree or PhD, especially those situated in rural areas or ‘difficult’ zones.

Also in 2013, the Plan Perú Maestro was introduced, focusing on opportunities for professional development, in-service teacher training, participation in education policies, and incentives for good performance. Regarding the last point, additional incentives are expected:

- summer and winter internship programmes in which 50 international and 500 national scholarships are granted in coordination with the national scholarship programme;
- awarding of the Palmas Magisteriales (previously described in Section 2.4);
- programme of pedagogical excellence called Creatividad Docente (Teacher Creativity) for outstanding teachers who reflect, systematize, and share their good teaching practices;
- annual competition in good teaching practices rewarding teachers for creativity, innovation, and problem solving;
- annual competition in use and production of audiovisual narratives, which recognizes their uses in the classroom and considers them as educational resources;
- TV show *Maestros que Inspiran* (Teachers Who Inspire), in which educational processes are shown and teachers are the protagonists.

Other allowances (beneficios) paid to all teachers include a holiday bonus, a child education grant, and a subsidy for the death of a close family member or another teacher.
4. Implementation of the reform

4.1 Financial challenges

The LRM is an ambitious reform that faces some financial challenges in daily implementation, including:

- **Reallocation of teachers to the new salary spine:** The LRM reallocated teachers from previous norms into the new *escala magisterial*. However, some continue to receive their salary under the previous norms.
- **Challenges related to determining an appropriate value for RIM:** There is general consensus that the RIM is too low. To compensate for this and make the profession more attractive, MINEDU has provided a wide range of bonuses and incentives over the years. While it is essential to set a sustainable RIM amount for the national budget, the existence of a large number of incentive programmes has an impact on the overall coherence and financial weight of the pay scale.
- **Delays in payments:** One interviewee noted that there could be delays in payments related to salary increases or bonuses. Certain decisions related to payments are yet to be taken, such as how much to pay teachers temporarily occupying management positions.

4.2 Administration and management challenges

Administrative and management challenges observed in the early years of implementation include the following:

**Delays in implementation of evaluations**

At the time of the research, there had been significant delays in evaluating teachers eligible to receive a pay rise. However, in comparison with the implementation of previous teacher career regulations, most evaluation processes are now respected, although the performance evaluation of teachers in service has not yet been done (see Section 3.2).

**Entry evaluation system reduces chances to employ more permanent teachers**

Entry evaluation data reveal that there are too many candidates for positions in regional capitals and other urban areas and not enough for remote and rural areas. Indeed, there is no system to reallocate teachers who are not appointed to the position for which they applied. A MINEDU representative noted:

> The further away the position, the higher the probability that no one will [apply for it]. Teachers preferred to fight for a vacancy in Lima, even if the competition was very high, they preferred that instead of going to places where there was no competition and where it was way easier for them to enter the profession.

The number of contract teachers has soared since the entry evaluations began. In 2015, 8,105 out of 19,631 vacancies were filled by permanent teachers and the rest were filled by contract teachers. A teacher representative claimed this situation had been unexpected:

> Out of the 200,000 [candidates] who applied to enter the teaching profession, 20,000 passed the evaluation and only 8,000 were employed as permanent teachers. Here also on the part of the ministry there was a lack of planning, forecasting, and imposing ceilings so that there are equal opportunities for everyone. ... A school [had a vacancy] and up to 40 candidates applied for it; 39 passed the first phase of the evaluation but left without a job, while certain schools had no candidates.
Technical challenges related to mass teacher evaluation

The planned performance evaluation of teachers in service is unprecedented for Peru both in terms of coverage (all teachers will be evaluated) and impact (teachers can be dismissed). Such a large-scale evaluation system requires huge human, technical, and financial resources that Peru is finding difficult to mobilize. That partly explains why this evaluation system is not yet operational. In 2016, the interviewee from the National Education Council questioned the feasibility of such an evaluation due to the large number of teachers to be assessed.

Difficulty incorporating a multitude of incentive programmes into a coherent teacher career structure

Implementation of the teacher career system, as well as a need to motivate, attract, and retain good teachers, led to the introduction of a wide range of bonuses, awards, allowances, and incentives, both as part of the 2012 LRM and outside that framework. While they generated short-term interest among teachers, the measures are not always well integrated enough to form a coherent teacher career structure, resulting in distortions and other adverse effects.

An attempt to address previous malpractice

The national ombudsman reported that the education sector in 2009 accounted for the highest number of complaints in five of Peru’s 25 regions (Apurímac, Arequipa, Ayacucho, Cusco, and Lambayeque), which together totalled 2,719 complaints. Complaints were related to bias in teacher selection, irregularities in the form of payments, lack of transparency and efficient access to information, selling of evaluation tests, and irregularities in administrative procedures (Defensoría del Pueblo, 2009). A SUTEP representative described mutual accusations of cheating between the union and the government, saying they damaged trust in the teaching profession:

In 2007, it was scandalous because people used to go to the photocopier of the National Engineering University and could see that everyone was pulling out his/her copy of the exam … [The government] denounced us, saying that we had stolen and leaked the exam. ... It was a very complex environment. ... It is difficult to recover the trust.

The LRM aimed to establish rigorous recruitment and evaluation processes to counter malpractice and restore trust and transparency, as a former MINEDU representative noted:

The leaking of tests made teachers lose faith [in the evaluation] ... and now attention is paid to these aspects. ... The sector is assuming this process in its entirety. ... They put in place the necessary security measures.

However, several issues still need to be dealt with, including:

- The lack of an articulated information system that can be rapidly accessed. This is particularly important, as it is the basis for the design of certain incentives and allowances (such as allowances for teachers working in rural areas).
- Unclear and insufficiently specific evaluation standards in the MBDD for different types and levels of teacher.

4.3 Participation and communication

Participation in the design of the new teacher career law was selective, with priority given to specialists and experts on the subject. The roles of SUTEP and the CPPe in the policy formulation was marginal in comparison with previous teacher management laws. Teacher representatives complained that their role in the reform implementation was also reduced. SUTEP and the CPPe presented a draft law to Congress, but it was rejected. Once the LRM was approved, MINEDU invited various stakeholders, including SUTEP and CPPe,
to discuss the regulations implementing the law. Support from all key institutional actors allowed for fairly quick approval and implementation of the LRM.

Although MINEDU was in charge of shaping the reform from the top down, it emphasized communication among stakeholders during each phase. For example, it created virtual and direct communication spaces to communicate with teachers:

- A platform allowed teachers to air their doubts, and the ministry to respond to complaints and suggestions.
- Communities of learning encouraged sharing of pedagogical experience.
- Virtual networks totalling 2,500 groups enabled planning of activities and production and exchange of educational materials.

MINEDU also communicated about the reform to the general public and teachers through conferences, expositions, information sessions in regions, and TV and radio shows.

*Table 8* sums up the three main aspects of the status of LRM implementation as of the time of the research.

**Table 8. Key aspects of LRM implementation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative and management</th>
<th>Financial</th>
<th>Participation and communication</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Delays in implementation of evaluation</td>
<td>• Challenges related to determining an appropriate value for RIM</td>
<td>• Top-down reform supported by key government institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Entry system allowing many candidates to pass the test but remain unemployed due to preference for urban areas</td>
<td>• Delays in payments</td>
<td>• Multiple tools to communicate with teachers and general public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of technical and professional support and information systems, as well as human resources, to conduct evaluations</td>
<td>• Need to determine certain salary increases for temporary promotions</td>
<td>• Reduced role of teacher representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Difficulty incorporating multiple incentive programmes into a coherent teacher career structure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. Perceived effects

The topic of performance-based pay has been intensely debated since its introduction in Peru in the 2000s. One hypothesis behind the evaluation policy supported by the LRM is that, by providing incentives according to teachers’ results, the government hopes to improve their motivation and, consequently, the quality of their teaching. However, problems in implementation of the previous teacher career structures made teachers sceptical about linking their salary level to the teacher evaluation process (Van der Tuin and Verger, 2013). Therefore, MINEDU’s ability to properly implement the new teacher career structure will be key in sustaining teacher motivation. Further research on the impact of sanctions linked to teacher evaluation on teacher motivation in Peru would be required.

5.1 Motivation and satisfaction

The study revealed that it was difficult to provide a clear picture of the impact of the career reform on teacher motivation and satisfaction due to a combination of factors affecting that relationship. Actors’ opinions differ according to their role and position in the education system as well as their involvement in the design and implementation of the reform. The most salient aspects are considered here.

The previous teacher career structure reduced teacher satisfaction and motivation due to inconsistency and malpractice in the reform implementation, conflicting relations between implementers and teachers, and low budgetary allocations to teacher salaries. The LRM has been perceived by the education community as an opportunity to overcome these issues.

Through the LRM, MINEDU has sought to promote renewed national interest in public education and to position itself as a reliable and supportive interlocutor for teachers. The reform contributed to the development of a coherent and harmonized teacher career structure, allowing teachers to more clearly identify institutions responsible for their career management.

The fact that the reform introduced clear standards that specified what teachers should know, combined with meritocratic, transparent, and participative evaluation processes, helped reprofessionalize the teaching profession. Teachers can stay in the classroom while progressing in their career, which gives additional value to their work.

Communication has played a key role in promoting a new vision of teachers as competent professionals responsible for transmitting knowledge and values to students. The government has considerably changed the language it uses in its communications, making it more direct, participative, and respectful, and moving from a confrontational approach that often devalued teachers’ work to one encouraging team spirit and embracing notions such as common goals, participation, and recognition. A MINEDU representative noted:

There has been historical mistreatment of teachers and devaluation of their profession in which the state participated, represented by MINEDU, in previous administrations. This has, fortunately, changed. I think there is a consensus on the need to revalue the profession and there are growing policy measures that are advancing in this direction.

Certain factors negatively influenced teacher motivation, however. When teachers were reassigned to the escala magisterial, those who had been under the LCPM saw their level raised, while many long-time LP teachers were put on the four lower levels of the new scale, which they considered a deterioration of their position. Moreover, implementation delays meant they could not climb the scale. The result was strong dissatisfaction. To resolve this, an exceptional evaluation approved in 2014 made it possible to shift some of these teachers from Level III directly to Level VI.
Another issue is that the design of the *escala magisterial* does not enable all teachers to reach the maximum salary. For instance, the most experienced LP teachers placed at lower salary levels would never reach the highest level during their working life because a set number of years had to be spent at each level. Some interviewees said this generated dissatisfaction among teachers who suspected a lack of government commitment to implement the reform.

Evaluation delays have exacerbated this issue, as they tend to lead to a feeling of uncertainty among teachers and a lack of interest in participating in the career structure. The result could be more teachers seeking to work outside the reform framework, e.g. on the CAS, thus increasing the number of good teachers leaving classrooms.

The creation of CAS positions weakens implementation of the reform. Teachers in these positions receive higher salaries for the same activities as normal teachers. This is the case, for example, of teachers working at high performance schools (*colegios de alto rendimiento*). The gap promotes neither professional development nor a coherent line of progression in the teacher career system. The fact that teachers accept these positions might reflect the low base pay for teaching, which often makes it necessary to find additional revenue sources.

Some experts believe the reform does not give enough incentive for teamwork and instead values individual teacher tasks. The reform entails many measures linked to extrinsic motivation (bonuses or incentives awarded when certain criteria are met), which tend to reinforce a feeling of control and need to achieve short-term goals. On the other hand, some measures are promising because they enable recognition of innovative pedagogical practices. Further institutionalization of the latter type of initiative would enable promoting teamwork and teacher autonomy. It is also worth mentioning that teacher teamwork is, to a certain extent, developed in entities such as the Consejo Participativo Local de Educación.

The status of contract teachers also has a negative influence on their motivation. They occupy positions permanent teachers do not want, often in disadvantaged zones, and if they decide to enter the profession as permanent teachers, their time teaching on contract is not taken into account.

Finally, the reform reduced the age of retirement from 70 to 65, displeasing older teachers who did not wish to retire because pensions are low. This factor needs further examination, as it is also part of the teacher work cycle.

### 5.2 Attraction

The number of candidates for the entry examination is high and many do not succeed in entering the profession as permanent teachers. While this attests to a certain degree of attractiveness of the teaching profession in Peru, it is worth repeating that many vacancies in remote and rural areas are filled by contract teachers who lack the necessary certification. In addition, many candidates taking the entry examination are teachers from private schools who want to migrate to public ones. While this phenomenon should be further investigated, interviewees believe it might be due to better working conditions in the public sector. A representative of the Consejo Nacional de Educación pointed out: ‘An interesting indicator showing how this career structure motivates is that during the last evaluation to enter the profession [2015], 40 per cent of teachers that applied to participate were from private schools.’ This might confirm the attractiveness of the career structure, especially for those in precarious private sector jobs with low salaries.

While certain aspects of the LRM may have influenced the level of attractiveness of the profession, others are problematic.
The reform managed to adjust salary differences among levels in the *escala magisterial*. Before 2012, the difference between the Level I salary and that of the highest level had decreased significantly over the years. For example, Saavedra and Díaz (2000) note that in 1980 the top-level salary was 290 per cent higher than Level I. By 1990, the difference had fallen to 34 per cent and in 1999 it was 9.7 per cent: Rivero (2003) reports that in 2000 the average Level I salary was PEN 765 (US$238) while that of Level V was PEN 840 (US$261). The researchers agreed that the reduced difference between salary levels affected the attractiveness of the profession.

On the other hand, the transparency of evaluation procedures and salary progression increased the attractiveness, though some interviewees said the duration of stay at each level required for promotion might be an obstacle for young teachers who lacked the required working years but met other requirements, such as titles, certification, and accreditation.

Finally, all interviewees said the value of RIM was so low in comparison with other professions that it might prevent the best candidates from joining the profession.

### 5.3 Retention

The key aim of the reform was to select and retain the best candidates for the profession through selection and performance evaluations. At the time of this study, it was too soon to evaluate the LRM’s retention capacity. However, teacher job security and high unemployment rates in Peru are important factors encouraging teachers to stay in the profession. Even if they must undergo evaluations to enter and remain in the profession, it offers more stability than other types of jobs, especially in the private sector.

SUTEP and some professionals nevertheless criticized the current career system’s ability to retain teachers. They said teachers were now asked to conduct tasks outside the classroom without adequate compensation.
Conclusion

The LRM aimed to attract the best candidates to guarantee an education of good quality for all Peruvian children. The resulting teacher career structure tries to ensure that teachers are motivated to improve their qualifications and performance by providing them with a wider range of horizontal and vertical promotion opportunities as well as salary increases. The reform sought to simplify a complex career structure in which teachers belonged to different, unequal career frameworks. It also gave MINEDU an opportunity to change its image to that of an institution willing to set clear rules and standards, end malpractice, and support teachers in their work.

MINEDU has successfully shifted a negative, conflicting discourse around teachers’ work to one that values and recognizes the teaching profession. An innovative, large-scale communication strategy has been key in this endeavour, although the design of the LRM was mainly top-down, reducing the role of SUTEP and the CPPe.

The teacher career is now based on evaluations for teacher entry, stay, and promotion, which are thought to promote a meritocracy among teachers. The evaluations involve standardized processes and participation of various actors. They also require important financial, technical, and human resources, and thus are not easy to implement. This represents a major challenge, especially given the number of teachers to be evaluated, and hence the teacher performance evaluation was not yet operational at the time of this research. Delays in the implementation of other evaluations were also observed.

Additional research is needed to further explore teachers’ opinion of the LRM evaluation policy, which links sanctions (including the possibility of dismissal) and rewards to performance. In addition, the MBDD, which sets out the competences required to enter, remain, and move forward in the profession, still lacks specific measurement criteria and indicators.

While the LRM has clearly helped harmonize teacher career regulations, it fails to fully and coherently integrate the many incentive mechanisms into the career structure. These incentives, however, appear to be important to compensate for a comparatively low base salary.

The high number of contract teachers is another challenge, partly explained by the system’s failure to attract permanent teachers to rural and remote areas. It is important to assess the costs and benefits associated with leaving around half of all vacancies unfilled due to lack of applicants. Finally, many observers criticize the career structure design because some teachers cannot reach the highest level of the salary scale by the end of their career.

13. The historical struggle between MINEDU and designated teachers may also explain some of the opposition to the evaluations. Earlier attempts to evaluate teachers’ performance led teachers to defend their right to stability at work and sometimes to express distrust in the government’s management.
Annex: Decrees, laws, and resolutions


Decreto Supremo N° 004-2013-ED. Reglamento de la Ley de Reforma Magisterial.


Decreto Supremo N° 014-2014-EF. Establece vigencia, características, criterios y montos de las asignaciones por tipo y ubicación de las Instituciones Educativas, así como de la asignación especial por labores en el VRAEM.

Decreto Supremo N° 051-95-ED. Aprueba la organización interna y las funciones generales de los órganos del MINEDU.

Decreto Supremo N° 227-2013-EF. Establece el monto de la asignación temporal por desempeño de cargo de Director y Subdirector de la Institución Educativa Pública.

Decreto Supremo N° 290-2012-EF. Fija la Remuneración Íntegra Mensual (RIM) de la Primera Escala Magisterial en el marco de la Ley N° 29.944.

Decreto Supremo N° 309-2013-EF. Establece el monto único del subsidio por Luto y Sepelio.


Ley N° 29.510. Establece la no exigencia de colegiación para el ejercicio de la docencia.


Ley N° 30.002. Ley que establece las características de la Remuneración Íntegra Mensual (RIM), Lima, 15 de marzo del 2013.


Resolución de Secretaría General N° 813-2014-MINEDU. Norma para los concursos excepcionales de reubicación en la tercera, cuarta, quinta y sexta escala magisterial.

Resolución Ministerial N° 051-2016-MINEDU. Norma que regula los concursos públicos de acceso a cargos directivos de unidades de gestión local y direcciones regionales de educación en el marco de la carrera pública magisterial, de la Ley de Reforma Magisterial.


Resolución Ministerial N° 298-2014-MINEDU. Cronograma y metas de reubicación en la tercera, cuarta, quinta y sexta escala magisterial.

Resolución Ministerial N° 524-2015-MINEDU. Aprueban concurso público de acceso a cargos directivos de unidades de gestión local y direcciones regionales de educación en el marco de la carrera pública magisterial, de la Ley de Reforma Magisterial.

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Teacher career reforms in Peru

The Peruvian Government passed the Ley de Reforma Magisterial (LRM, Teacher Reform Law) in 2012, striving to simplify a complex teacher career structure that consisted of varying and unequal frameworks. The new system bases teacher selection and promotion on a series of standardized evaluations and assessments, while establishing opportunities for teachers to move horizontally and vertically through the system via a career ladder. This ambitious reform seeks to select and retain the best talent while tying promotion and salary raises to professional performance. An innovative, large-scale communication strategy was a key feature of the reform process.

This country note was conducted within the framework of an international research project on teacher careers implemented by the UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP). It explores the LRM in Peru by fully examining its structure and analysing improvements made to previous teacher career systems. This publication further investigates the sheer scope of the reform and the significant delays in implementation resulting from administrative and financial hurdles.

About the author

Margarita Mendoza Choque is the coordinator for the Ayacucho region of UNESCO’s Rural Secondary Education Program, Horizons. She has worked as a researcher on issues of childhood, adolescence, education, and teaching, and as an evaluator of programmes and projects for the public sector and non-governmental organizations. At IIEP Buenos Aires, she studied the formulation and planning of educational policies.